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The Bologna process aims at creating a European Higher Education Area where inter-country 
mobility of students and staff, as well as workers holding a degree, is facilitated. While 
several aspects of the process deserve wide public support, the reduction of the length of the 
first cycle of studies to three years, in several continental European countries where it used to 
last for four or five years, is less consensual. The paper checks the extent of public confidence 
in the restructuring of higher education currently underway, by looking at its implications on 
the demand for academic programs in Portugal. Precise quantification of the demand for each 
academic program is facilitated by the rules of access to higher education, in a nation-wide 
competition, where candidates must list up to six preferences of institution and program. We 
use regression analysis applied to count data, estimating negative binomial models. Results 
indicate that the programs that restructured to follow the Bologna principles were subject to 
higher demand than comparable programs that did not restructure, as if Bologna were 
understood as a quality stamp. This positive impact was reinforced if the institution was a 
leader, i.e. the single one in the country that restructured that program. Still an additional 
increase in demand was experienced by large programs that restructured to offer an integrated 
master degree, thus conforming to Bologna principles while not reducing the program 
duration. 
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The Bologna process is a far-reaching reform, involving currently 45 countries, which
aims at the creation of a European Higher Education Area by 2010. Major steps in
that direction, currently underway, include the creation of a comparable structure of
academic degrees, mutual recognition of diplomas and course units, the assessment of
academic institutions and programs based on common quality standards, and direct
incentives to geographical mobility of students and staﬀ. Implementation of a common
structure of academic degrees means that some continental European countries are
having to move from a four- or ﬁve-year ﬁrst cycle of studies into a shorter three-year
one, which led to controversy. On the one hand, the advantages of having a degree
recognized in a wider geographical space are praised, together with the redevelopment
of curricula that makes learning more student-centered and focused on the development
of competencies, while enabling earlier entrance into the labor market. On the other
hand, distrust has been expressed over the academic contents and adequacy to labor
market needs of the competencies transmitted in a shorter three-year period, with fears
that the employability of graduates will be reduced, when compared to graduates of
the longer cycle.
This study aims at checking the degree of public conﬁdence in the restructuring of
the ﬁrst cycle of higher education studies currently taking place under the Bologna
process. More precisely, we concentrate on the reaction of students, to analyze the
impact of the Bologna restructuring on demand for academic programs by candidates
to higher education. We focus on the Portuguese system.
We take advantage, ﬁrst of all, of the legal setting in Portugal, where institutions
were given the option to adjust their academic programs to the Bologna curricula
starting in the academic year 2006/07, or to defer adjustment to one of the two following
years. Therefore, in 2006/07 a group of early implementers coexists with a group
of academic programs that still have not undergone change, and students were free
to choose where they would like to be admitted. Under this setting, the decisions
by academic institutions and students can be analyzed in the conventional signaling
framework (Gibbons, 1992; Salani´ e, 2000). Academic institutions decide whether to
adopt immediately the Bologna principles and students decide whether to apply to a
Bologna program. Institutions are in this case the informed players, who have insider
1information on program quality, which they can choose to reveal (or not) by means of
signals. Interestingly, in the public debate surrounding the Bologna changes, the idea
that institutions that adapted ﬁrst were signaling their readiness for change and their
higher quality, was often stressed. Prospective students, on the other hand, are free
to apply to a particular institution and they are presumably interested in attending
an institution that guarantees a certain education quality (Long, 2004). Whereas the
program quality is institution’s private information, the decision to conform to the
Bologna principles is publicly observed. Under this framework, our main purpose is to
test whether students sort out academic programs by looking at whether the curriculum
has been adapted to Bologna.
Secondly, the analysis is facilitated by the system of access to higher education in
Portugal. Candidates must clearly rank up to six choices of institution and academic
program, and a national competition follows, run by the Ministry of Science, Technol-
ogy and Higher Education (MSTHE), which allocates candidates based on their relative
performance and the number of available vacancies posted by each institution for each
program. Thirdly, we have a comprehensive dataset on the application process, which
renders this analysis feasible.
The paper proceeds describing the main characteristics of the Bologna process in
the international context, in section 2.1. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 concentrate on Portugal,
to present the higher education system and describe the implementation of the Bologna
process, showing how it provides good conditions for economic analysis under the basic
signaling framework. The empirical strategy is presented in the following sections:
section 3.1 presents the data set and section 3.2 describes the method and major
problems to be tackled. Section 4 discusses the results, before concluding comments
are presented.
2 Implementation of the Bologna process
2.1 International context
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed in Europe an expansion of the higher education system.
Since then, the number of students has increased rapidly and new types of higher
education programs have been created (e.g., professional higher education). Meanwhile,
an increasing number of students decided to go abroad for at least part of their higher
2education. With rising international mobility of students, European countries started
considering the coordination of their higher education systems. At the same time,
globalization and increased international competition highlighted the importance of
making European higher education institutions attractive to the world. Initial steps
towards the coordination of European higher education systems were taken with the
signature of the Sorbonne declaration by the Ministers in charge of higher education
of France, Italy, United Kingdom and Germany, in 1998, and later, in 1999, with
the signature of the Bologna declaration. These steps were followed by Ministerial
Conferences at Prague 2001, Berlin 2003, and Bergen 2005.
The Bologna process aims at creating a European Higher Education Area, where
internal mobility of students, teachers, and administrative staﬀ is facilitated, whose
competitiveness attracts students from outside and contributes to the broader aim of
turning Europe into a leading knowledge-based society. For a discussion of the beneﬁts
of degree standardization and harmonization and of international mobility, in creating
competitive European higher education institutions see, among others, van der Ploeg
and Veugelers (2007). The main pillars of the process include:
• Comparability of the degree structure, based on three cycles: the bachelor degree
(three years, according to the dominant model), the master (normally two years),
and the doctorate.
• Mutual recognition of degrees, other awards, and course units. Further to a com-
parable degree structure, a system of academic credits was created, whose accumu-
lation and transferability across countries is guaranteed, enabling mutual recogni-
tion of degrees, other academic qualiﬁcations, and periods of study abroad. In the
same line, a Diploma Supplement was introduced, which describes the degree and
qualiﬁcations obtained, in terms of workload, level, and learning outcomes. The
overall aim is to improve transparency of higher education degrees and to render
more ﬂexible progression into further studies and access to the labor market, while
improving the attractiveness of the European higher education system.
• Assessment and accreditation of institutions and academic programs based on
shared quality standards and procedures.
• Development of mobility programs by student, teaching, research and administra-
tive staﬀ, including measures such as the portability of national loans and grants.
3• External dimension of the process, through exchange and cooperation with other
parts of the world (for example, Latin American and the Caribbean).
Even though the process is far-reaching and multifaceted, much attention has been
devoted to the changes in the degree structure. Indeed, according to the model that
predominated in several continental European countries, the ﬁrst higher education
degree was obtained after four to ﬁve years of successful study. Therefore, the curricula
changes necessary to bring the ﬁrst degree down to three-years are being implemented
amidst some controversy.
On one hand, the advantages of having a comparable degree structure are stressed,
as the system becomes more transparent and obstacles to the mobility of students and
workers are reduced. However, the new curricula are often interpreted as a compressed
version of the longer programs, and critics claim that there will not be enough time
for assimilation, reﬂection and a critical approach to learning, which will undermine
the quality of the degree. Under these circumstances, the employability of the new
graduates might be reduced, when competing with graduates from the previous system
of a longer ﬁrst cycle. Moreover, there is the fear that public funding will be restricted
to the ﬁrst (three-year) cycle, thus imposing a higher burden on students if they want to
progress beyond the ﬁrst degree, when compared to the system that used to guarantee
public funding for four or ﬁve years.
The relevance attached to this issue varies across scientiﬁc ﬁelds, with the problem
usually not raised in the humanities, while it is highlighted in several countries for
occupations regulated by professional bodies (Reichert and Tauch, 2005) and subject
to speciﬁc European Union coordination mechanisms (see the case of architecture and
health sciences).
Between optimism and skepticism, it is not certain how the behavior of students
and labor market agents will change during the period of adjustment to the Bologna
changes in higher education curricula.
2.2 Portuguese higher education system: organization and admission pro-
cedures
Portugal has a binary higher education system comprising universities and polytechnic
schools.1 The former aim at providing general academic education and they are in
1As well as the military and police institutions, and the Open University (institution for distance learning).
4charge of most research activity, whereas the latter are traditionally more vocationally
oriented. This study concentrates on the publicly funded higher education system,
which comprises 14 universities and 26 polytechnics.2
Most higher education institutions are located in the densely populated coastal
area. The capital, Lisbon, harbors four universities; among the remaining universities,
three are located in the north (Braga/Guimar˜ aes, Oporto and Vila Real), three in
the center (Aveiro, Coimbra and Covilh˜ a), two in the south (´ Evora, Faro) and two
in the islands (Azores and Madeira). Polytechnics are the result of a policy of local
development promotion. Though more evenly spread over the country, there is still
some concentration by the coastal line.
Enrollment in higher education is limited by a system of numerus clausus. The
number of vacancies is deﬁned yearly by each institution, subject to communication
to the MSTHE.3 The application process takes place at the centralized national level.
Each candidate ranks up to six priorities, each comprising a pair institution/program.
The nation-wide competition that follows allocates the candidates based on their grade
point average and the stated ranking of preferences.
Successful completion of secondary education is a prerequisite for admission into
higher education by students younger than 23 years.4 In addition, candidates must
pass national admission exams. Deﬁnition of the number of exams, their subjects, the
minimum classiﬁcation required, the weighting scheme to compute the ﬁnal grade point
average, and the minimum grade point average required, rests with each institution.5
In any case, the number of exams required must be one or two, and the computation of
the ﬁnal grade point average (expressed in a scale of 0 to 200) for ranking the applicants
to each institution and program must obey the following rules: the grade point average
at completion of secondary school, which takes into consideration the three ﬁnal years
of secondary school, must have a weight of at least 50 percent; the speciﬁc national
2The private system comprises 55 universities and 60 polytechnics, but most of these institutions are of small
dimension, oﬀering a very restricted number of study programs, in one or two areas. This sub-system is not subject to
analysis here, ﬁrst of all because private providers have more freedom to deﬁne the application and admission rules (for
example, the timing for applications is very diﬀerent, with several private institutions deﬁning the application phase
such that students can still apply after they know the results from the public sector contest). Secondly, there is no
centralized application procedure in the private sector, thus making it very diﬃcult to collect enough and comparable
data for analysis.
3Who can, under special circumstances, change the proposal. For a few programs, joint approval by this Ministry
and a second one is required.
425 years old, until 2005. Older candidates who do not hold a secondary school degree are subject to a diﬀerent set
of exams speciﬁc to each program.
5In special cases where physical, vocational or other abilities are relevant, other speciﬁc admission requirements may
apply (pr´ e-requisitos).
5admission exam(s) must have a weight of at least 35 percent.6
Certain admission exams are known to place tougher requirements on the applicants.
Traditionally hard subjects are: mathematics, where only 26% of the students obtained
in 2006 a passing grade (27% in 2005, and 31% in 2004 and 2003); physics, where the
share of students passing the exam was 30%, 47%, 37%, and 22%, respectively in 2006,
2005, 2004, and 2003; and chemistry, where those shares were, respectively, 35%, 52%,
41% and 53%.
The allocation of candidates comprises two major phases: the ﬁrst one takes place in
July/August; the second takes place in August/September and includes the vacancies
that have not been ﬁlled in the ﬁrst phase. Students who were not successful in the
ﬁrst phase, or who were successful but wish to change the institution/program where
they were placed, and those who had not applied in the ﬁrst phase (either because they
did not yet fulﬁll all the requirements or because, though fulﬁlling the requirements,
had decided not to apply), are eligible to apply in the second phase.
2.3 The Bologna process in Portugal: a signaling framework
The implementation of the Bologna process, led by the Portuguese MSTHE, is part of
a process of reorganization and rationalization of the higher education system (OECD,
2006), taking place in a framework of growing imbalances between demand and sup-
ply. In fact, the number of students enrolled in higher education doubled during the
1990s, with enrollment in public universities increasing by 62% (MSTHE, 2006) and
the remaining being absorbed through expansion of public polytechnics and the private
sector. However, since then a number of factors have combined to generate excess of
capacity and increasing competition for students between institutions. Among these
factors, the MSTHE (2006) stresses: the decline in the number of candidates, due
to demographic changes; the increasingly strict admission conditions, following the
reintroduction of national admission exams and minimum grades; and the increased
number of vacancies, due to large investments made in the public sector.
This increased competition motivated strategies of diﬀerentiation by institutions,
namely by deﬁning diﬀerent entry conditions, with the most recognized institutions
setting higher entrance standards and, therefore, targeting diﬀerent segments of the
student population (MSTHE, 2006). The speed of adjustment to the Bologna process
6If other special requirements apply, they cannot be attached a weight larger that 15 percent.
6has often been pointed out as an instrument in this strategy of diﬀerentiation. Like
in other continental European countries, the reduction of the length of the ﬁrst cycle
of studies was one of the more debated Bologna changes. The common duration of a
higher education degree used to be in Portugal ﬁve years, until mid-1990s, when it was
reduced to four years; the Bologna process further imposes a reduction to three years.
There is nevertheless the possibility to keep the duration of a program longer. Whereas
the ﬁrst cycle (licenciatura) has a normal duration of three years and the second cycle
(mestrado) has a normal duration of one and a half or two years, in special cases it is
feasible to oﬀer a combined degree, the so-called integrated master, lasting for ﬁve to
six years.
Institutions could choose to start implementing the Bologna curricula changes in
the academic year of 2006/07 or one of the two following years. Some institutions saw
the prompt implementation of the Bologna process as an opportunity to establish or
reinforce a reputation of an up-to-date institution, whose graduates would beneﬁt from
the opportunities of a wider labor market. Institutions taking the lead might gain a
comparative advantage over the late-comers, not just attracting more applicants in the
ﬁrst year after restructuring, but also gaining a reputation beneﬁcial for future years.
Other institutions, instead, opted to delay the process, arguing that changes should be
thought over, and that the labor market would penalize the graduates from the new
shorter ﬁrst cycle. Table 5 shows that about 43% of the study programs have adjusted
to the Bologna principles. Table 6 further disaggregates that number by institution.
The decision by the University of Coimbra to defer to 2007/08 the adoption of the
new model (with exceptions authorized for programs on which a national consensus
for change had been reached among institutions) is evident in the table, as is the fact
that University of Madeira did not adapt any of its programs. This decision contrasted
to that of Universidade Nova de Lisboa and ISCTE, which moved ahead restructuring
most of its programs.
Previous research has suggested that the demand for higher education programs
depends on program quality and prestige (e.g., Long, 2004), which in turn reﬂects
on individuals labor market performance (e.g., Black and Smith, 2004). However, as
identiﬁed in the OECD’s review of the Portuguese higher education system, “the level
of public information on course content, program goals, quality and opportunities and
graduate employment is inadequate or unavailable”(OECD, 2006: 27). For example, it
7was just in 2006 that a formal independent accreditation agency was announced, start-
ing activity in 2007. The lack of independent institutions delivering publicly available
quality assessments implies that students lack precise guidance in their choice processes.
In this context, the decision regarding adoption of the Bologna principles can be
analyzed in the framework of the conventional signaling model, where students can infer
the quality of the academic program by checking whether it has been reformulated
to follow the Bologna principles.7 In the signaling process between institutions and
students, the former is the informed player, having insider information on program
quality. Even though quality is not synonymous with being in the leading group of
Bologna adopters, in the public discussions it has often been highlighted that readiness
for change towards international standards and fulﬁllment of stricter quality guidelines,
provides an indication of academic quality. Moreover, the quality of the academic
program and its ability to adapt to Bologna rules may be positively correlated, if both
depend on the quality of the research activities developed in a department or even
the readiness to work of its staﬀ members. Having allowed institutions to choose the
moment to implement the Bologna principles, the Portuguese higher education sector
provides a good illustration of the strategic problem of institutions.
Students may themselves have opted for contrasting strategies. Some may associate
Bologna with a quality stamp and a guarantee of recognition of the degree in a wider
geographical space, yielding better employment opportunities, whereas others may
attach a higher reputation to a more established longer program. The candidates to
a higher education degree will be the agent we consider, and their demand for higher
education programs the precise indicator under scrutiny. The aim is to check whether
students read the Bologna signal as an indicator of program quality.
This analysis is rendered feasible by the fact that admission into higher education
in Portugal is strictly regulated and implemented through a nation-wide competition,
where candidates must clearly state their preferences for institutions and academic
programs. Demand can thus be quantiﬁed in an unequivocal way.
7For an example of a signaling game applied to the higher education system, see Mizrahi and Mehrez (2002).
83 Empirical strategy
3.1 Data set
The data used is made publicly available by the MSTHE, on a web site of the Depart-
ment of Higher Education (DGES) dedicated to announce the results of the process of
allocation of candidates to higher education programs.8
Data for the academic years 2003/2004 to 2006/2007 have been collected. The
following variables are available: overall demand for each program (total number of
students listing the pair institution/program among their preferences, irrespective of
its ranking), as well as the number of students who have selected each program as
their ﬁrst choice, second choice and so forth (up to a maximum of six choices); number
of vacancies available at each program in each of the two stages of the application
process; national admission exams required by the program, with the major ones being
mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and portuguese; the ﬁeld of study of the
program.9
Table 5 in appendix provides descriptive statistics on the dataset. The second
phase of application involves, as expected, remarkably less applicants, since it can be
considered the residual phase. A declining trend in the number of applications can
be detected between 2003 and 2005, with an increase in the number of applicants
the following year. A declining proportion of programs required an entrance exam on
maths, physics, chemistry, biology or portuguese. The share of applicants to each ﬁeld
of study has remained rather stable over time.
3.2 Model under estimation
Two alternative concepts are used to quantify the demand for each program at an
institution:
• Hits: number of applicants who placed that program in that institution among
their choices (irrespective of its ranking, from ﬁrst to sixth).
• First choice: number of applicants who placed that institution and program as
their ﬁrst choice.
8Direc¸ c˜ ao Geral do Ensino Superior, at http://www.acessoensinosuperior.pt. Throughout the text, a program is
meant to refer to a pair institution/academic program, unless otherwise explicitly explained.
9We have consistently used the classiﬁcation adopted by the Ministry in 2006, which includes ten areas: agriculture,
architecture, natural sciences, law and social sciences, economics and business, sports and arts, education, humanities,
health, and technologies.
9The dependent variable in our model is thus a nonnegative integer. The distribution
of the variable is in both cases skewed to the left. As such, an adequate tool to model
the process is the count data regression analysis (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).
Given the panel structure of the data, we started with the ﬁxed eﬀects Poisson
model, to take into account unobserved heterogeneity across academic programs. The
descriptive statistics reveal that the dependent variable presents raw overdispersion.
This indicates that the negative binomial regression model might be more appropriate
for our data, since it relaxes the hypothesis of equal mean and variance. The results of
formal overdispersion tests indeed show clearly that a negative binomial speciﬁcation
is more appropriate.10
However, Allison and Waterman (2002) point out that the ﬁxed-eﬀects negative
binomial model, as deﬁned by Hausman et al. (1984), is not a ﬁxed-eﬀects model in
the usual sense, because the ﬁxed eﬀect applies to the overdispersion parameter, rather
than to the covariates. That is, that model speciﬁcation solves the overdispersion
problem, but does not guarantee that the program-speciﬁc eﬀects are conditioned out
of the likelihood. Guimar˜ aes further shows that in the parameterization proposed by
Hausman et al. (1984) “the individual ﬁxed eﬀects will cancel out only if [...] there
is a speciﬁc functional relation between the individual ﬁxed eﬀect and the individual
overdispersion parameter”(Guimar˜ aes, 2006: 4), which is not necessarily true. As such,
a test for the null hypothesis of successful removal of the ﬁxed eﬀects is required. To
our knowledge, the only test available is that proposed by Guimar˜ aes (2006). When
applied to our data, that test rejects the null hypothesis. Nevertheless, according to the
simulations performed by Guimar˜ aes (2006), the test is not recommended for samples
with small time dimensions, as is our case.11
Gathering all the arguments and evidence, we have decided to implement in the
analysis that follows the strategy by Allison and Waterman (2002), which consists on
estimation on the pooled sampled of an unconditional negative binomial model with
dummy variables to account for the ﬁxed eﬀects. We report below the results of this
10The test is based on the idea that a ﬁxed eﬀects Poisson model can be seen as a multinomial model (see Guimar˜ aes
and Lindrooth, 2005), implying that testing for overdispersion in the multinomial model can achieve testing for overdis-
persion in the Poisson model. We then use a Pearson test for the null hypothesis of no overdispersion in the multinomial
model, which is rejected at any ordinary level of signiﬁcance in all the speciﬁcations reported later. The overdispersion
test was implemented using the Stata command multin.
11According to Guimar˜ aes (2006: 7) “with panels as large as 1000 individuals the test requires at least 20 observations
per individual to adequately control for type I error.”
10model.12 Following Cameron and Trivedi (1998), the model is speciﬁed as











where y is the count for our dependent variable, µ = exp(xβ), α ≥ 0 is the overdisper-
sion parameter, Γ(.) is the gamma function, and x is a vector of regressors, including a
dummy variable for each study program. This speciﬁcation assumes constant disper-
sion within groups, equal to 1 + αµ. The mean and variance of y are deﬁned as µ and
µ + αµ2, respectively.
The vector of regressors x, the program attributes, includes, ﬁrst of all, whether
it requires a national admission exam in a particular subject (dummy variables for
mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and portuguese). Controlling for the sub-
jects required as admission exams is particularly relevant. Indeed, a generally poor
performance in the admission exam in a certain subject reduces the size of the pop-
ulation that can potentially apply to programs requiring that exam. Secondly, we
controlled for the scientiﬁc ﬁeld of the program (captured by 9 dummy variables). Dif-
ferent scientiﬁc ﬁelds reacted diﬀerently to the implementation of the Bologna process
(consider for example the contrast between humanities and other ﬁelds). Estimation
of the model including ﬁeld-speciﬁc dummy variables can control for these diﬀerences.
We also control for the phase of the application process, with a dummy variable equal
to one in the second phase, since this is a residual phase, for vacancies not previously
ﬁlled and students who were not placed in the ﬁrst phase or who wish to be placed
elsewhere. Given sharp diﬀerences in the dimension of the diﬀerent programs and
across institutions, we also control for the size of the program (number of vacancies
posted). The crucial variable, Bologna06, achieves the value one if the program was
restructured to adapt to the Bologna principles, and zero otherwise.
All the speciﬁcations include a ﬁxed eﬀect for each program. The model thus ac-
counts for endogenous adoption of the new academic model. In fact, the timing and
extent of adaptation to the Bologna principles may be viewed as a political decision
by the direction of the program at each institution, which may self-select into restruc-
turing promptly or delaying adjustment, based on, among other factors, expectations
about demand for their programs. These program-speciﬁc eﬀects capture as well fac-
12The results are similar to those obtained with the ﬁxed-eﬀects Poisson or negative binomial models. All sets of
results are available from the authors upon request.
11tors other than its strategy, such as the amount of resources, reputation, or regional
conditions.
Three variables were used to capture the group of Bologna adopters:
• Bologna implementer: a program at an institution, which has been restructured
according to the Bologna process.
• Bologna leader: a Bologna implementer, who was the only institution in the coun-
try that restructured that academic program. This group of early-implementers
has set itself apart from the other institutions in the country, making an early
move and most likely expecting to gain from its timing. It is a group more likely
to be aﬀected (either gaining or losing) by the change.
• Bologna implementer without shortening the duration of the program (integrated
master): the possibility used by some institutions to restructure a program while
nevertheless keeping a duration longer than the normal Bologna duration for the
ﬁrst cycle is explicitly taken into account. We distinguish between programs that
reduced their duration and those that, though having restructured to conform to
the Bologna principles, oﬀer a joint ﬁrst and second cycle degree, thus keeping a
longer duration.
Comparison of the ﬁrst and last speciﬁcations allows in particular to check the relevance
attached by candidates to the stamp and reputation associated with Bologna, and to
the change in the duration of the program.
4 Impact of the Bologna process
This section presents results of the estimation of the negative binomial model just
described. Alternative speciﬁcations of the model are reported, using in every case the
variable hits to quantify the demand for a program, i.e. the total number of candidates
that listed the program among their preferences, irrespective of its rank position. The
ﬁrst speciﬁcation controls for the phase in the application process, program size, the
set of admission exams required, ﬁeld of study and a time trend. Speciﬁcation 2 further
allows the time trend to diverge across ﬁelds of study. Speciﬁcation 3 further checks
whether the impact of the Bologna process was diﬀerent across ﬁelds of study.
12Table 1: Demand for academic programs (total number of students
choosing the program), negative binomial model

























































Field of study * year no yes yes



























N 7718 7718 7718
N-g 1323 1323 1323
LL -35972.83 -35723.63 -35712.13
Continued on next page...
13... table 1 continued
Variable Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. Standard er-
rors in parentheses: Huber-White adjusted standard errors, considering
clustering of observations within each academic program for diﬀerent
moments in time. N is the number of observations, N-g is the number
of groups institution/program, and LL stands for log-likelihood. All
regressions include program-speciﬁc dummy variables.
As a preliminary remark, note that this set of results clearly indicates the presence
of overdispersion (see the value and signiﬁcance of the estimated α parameter). This
is evidence in favor of the negative binomial speciﬁcation.
As expected, larger programs (posting more vacancies) are subject to larger de-
mand. Also quite naturally, the second phase gathers a remarkably lower number of
applications, since it is a residual phase. The demand for a higher education program
is strongly aﬀected by the performance of the candidates in the national admission
exams. Requirement of an admission exam on biology, mathematics or physics lowers
the demand for the program. Overall demand for university programs declined until
2005 (relative to 2003, the omitted category), recovering in 2006.
Programs that restructured to follow the Bologna principles were subject to an
increase in demand, when compared to programs that did not restructure. More pre-
cisely, those that restructured were subject to 21% (= exp(0.191)) higher demand (see
speciﬁcation 1). This eﬀect (slowly) decreases with the dimension of the academic pro-
gram (note that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on the size of the program interacted
with the Bologna dummy variable is negative, although small in absolute value). The
previous results are robust to the introduction (in speciﬁcation 2) of controls for the
diﬀerent trend over time in demand across scientiﬁc ﬁelds.
Speciﬁcation 3 further allows the impact of the adoption of the Bologna principles
to be heterogeneous across scientiﬁc ﬁelds. This is particularly relevant if one keeps in
mind that diﬀerent areas welcomed with diﬀerent degrees of enthusiasm or skepticism
the changes. We ﬁnd that in the humanities (the omitted category), restructuring of the
programs according to the Bologna process was associated with a 58% (= exp(0.456))
increase in demand (see the coeﬃcient on the overall Bologna dummy); that impact
was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for programs in law, economics and business, sports
and arts, education, and technology. The impact was negative for programs in the
architecture area, since its estimated coeﬃcient is negative and outweighs the positive
14Bologna eﬀect observed for the base category.13
Table 3 in appendix reports comparable results considering as dependent variable the
number of applicants who ranked the program as their ﬁrst choice. Speciﬁcations 1 and
2 report ﬁndings similar to the previous ones: having restructured to follow Bologna
is associated with a 18% to 22% (that is, exp(0.169) and exp(0.198), respectively)
increase in the demand for a program. Speciﬁcation 3 highlights the positive impact
of the Bologna restructuring on the ﬁrst choice of programs by candidates in the ﬁeld
of education.
We further checked whether the impact of the Bologna process could be diﬀerent,
depending on the intensity of the changes. First of all, we considered whether being a
national leader in a certain program implementing the Bologna curricula was associated
with some beneﬁt (or penalty) in terms of demand by prospective students (speciﬁca-
tion 4 in table 2). Secondly, we checked whether restructuring to oﬀer a joint ﬁrst and
second cycle degree (the so-called integrated master) of a longer duration yielded some
beneﬁt in terms of demand (speciﬁcation 5). Then we considered simultaneously those
two variables.
The ﬁrst column in table 2 indeed reveals that being a leader in the implementation
of the Bologna curricula led to an increase in demand for a program, above the increase
experienced by Bologna implementers in general. This eﬀect holds irrespective of the
size of the program.
As to the impact of restructuring to oﬀer an integrated master program, results
indicate that there was a positive impact on demand for programs that restructured and
kept a long duration, above the impact for Bologna implementers in general; however,
this increase in demand took place only for large programs.
Once we check jointly the impact of being a Bologna leader and the impact of
having restructured to oﬀer a long integrated master program, the previous results hold:
national leaders in the adoption of the Bologna curricula attracted more applicants than
Bologna changers in general, and a further increase in demand was directed at large
programs that became an integrated master under the Bologna setting.
13This study area includes not just strictly architecture, but also programs such as design.
15Table 2: Demand for academic programs (total number of students
choosing the program), including Bologna leader and integrated mas-
ter variables, negative binomial model

























Bologna leader * size program -0.001 -0.0006
(0.002) (0.001)
Integrated master 0.036 0.052
(0.112) (0.112)








































Field of study * year yes yes yes


















economics, business -0.215 -0.203 -0.196
(0.232) (0.238) (0.231)
sports, arts -0.088 0.009 -0.092
(0.669) (0.664) (0.664)
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16... table 2 continued
Variable Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6







N 7718 7718 7718
N-g 1323 1323 1323
LL -35706.39 -35698.47 -35692.73
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. Standard errors
in parentheses: Huber-White adjusted standard errors, considering cluster-
ing of observations within each academic program for diﬀerent moments in
time. N is the number of observations, N-g is the number of groups insti-
tution/program, and LL stands for log-likelihood. All regressions include
program-speciﬁc dummy variables.
Table 4 in appendix shows results of the same speciﬁcations, considering as depen-
dent variable the number of candidates who chose the program as their ﬁrst option.
Results highlight that the impact of the Bologna changes was more pronounced in
education; being a leader does not yield a signiﬁcant impact on the ﬁrst option listed
by candidates, while having restructured to become an integrated master does have a
positive impact.
5 Conclusion
We have checked the impact on the demand for academic programs resulting from the
remarkable changes in the curricula currently taking place under the Bologna process.
The relevance of the issue follows from the mix of enthusiasm and criticism that these
changes have raised, in countries where the ﬁrst cycle of higher education used to last
for four or ﬁve years and is now reduced to three years. Analysis of the issue is feasible
in Portugal, since the procedure of application to higher education takes place at the
centralized national level and candidates must clearly list their preferences in terms of
programs and institutions.
Results clearly indicate that programs that changed their curricula to conform to
the Bologna principles were subject to an increase in demand by prospective students.
That positive impact on demand was more pronounced if the institution took the lead,
being the only institution in the country that restructured the program. We also found
that large programs that changed their curriculum to oﬀer an integrated master, thus
conforming to the Bologna principles while not reducing the duration of the program,
were subject to a further increase in demand.
17References
Allison, Paul and Waterman (2002). Fixed-eﬀects negative binomial regression
models. Sociological Methodology, 32(1): 247-265.
Black, Dan A. and Jeffrey A. Smith (2004). How robust is the evidence on
the eﬀects of college quality? Evidence from matching. Journal of Econometrics,
121(1-2): 99-124.
Cameron, A. Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi (1998). Regression Analysis of
Count Data. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gibbons, Robert (1992). A Primer in Game Theory. London: Prentice Hall.
Guimar˜ aes, Paulo (2006). The ﬁxed eﬀects negative binomial model revisited.
Medical University of South Carolina, mimeo.
Guimar˜ aes, Paulo and Richard Lindrooth (2005). Dirichlet-multinomial re-
gression. Medical University of South Carolina, mimeo, available at:
http://129.3.20.41/eps/em/papers/0509/0509001.pdf.
Hausman, Jerry, Bronwyn H. Hall and Zvi Griliches (1984). Economet-
ric models for count data with an application to the patents-R&D relationship.
Econometrica, 52(4): 909-938.
Long, Bridget Terry (2004). How have college decisions changed over time? An
application of the conditional logistic choice model. Journal of Econometrics,
121(1-2): 271-296.
MSTHE (Ministry of Science, technology and Higher Education) (2006).
Reviews of National Policies for Education: Tertiary Education in Portugal. Back-
ground Report. Available at: http://www.mctes.pt/docs/
ﬁcheiros/EDU EC 2006 26.pdf.
Mizrahi, Shlomo and Abraham Mehrez (2002) Managing quality in higher
education systems via minimal quality requirements: signaling and control. Eco-
nomics of Education Review, 21(1): 53-62.
18OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development)
(2006). Reviews of National Policies for Education: Tertiary Education in Portu-
gal. Examiner’s Report. Available at: http://www.mctes.pt/docs/
ﬁcheiros/OCDE Relatorio 124 paginas .pdf.
Reichert, Sybille and Christian Tauch (2005). Trends IV: European Univer-
sities Implementing Bologna. Brussels: European University Association.
Salani´ e, Bernard (2000). The Economics of Contracts. A Primer. Cambridge:
The MIT Press.
van der Ploeg, Frederick and Reinhilde Veugelers (2007). Higher edu-
cation reform and the renewed Lisbon strategy: role of member states and the
European Commission. CESifo Working Paper Series 1901.
Appendix: additional tables
Table 3: Demand for academic programs (number of students choosing
the program as their ﬁrst choice), negative binomial model
























































Field of study * year no yes yes
Continued on next page...
19... table 3 continued
Variable Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Bologna06 * ﬁeld study:
agriculture -0.090
(0.268)






















N 7718 7718 7718
N-g 1323 1323 1323
LL -24638.71 -24444.02 -24431.2
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. Standard er-
rors in parentheses: Huber-White adjusted standard errors, considering
clustering of observations within each academic program for diﬀerent
moments in time. N is the number of observations, N-g is the number
of groups institution/program, and LL stands for log-likelihood. All
regressions include program-speciﬁc dummy variables.
Table 4: Demand for academic programs (number of students choosing
the program as their ﬁrst choice), including Bologna leader and inte-
grated master variables, negative binomial model











Bologna06 0.217 0.257 0.246
(0.205) (0.208) (0.204)





Bologna leader 0.010 0.010
(0.087) (0.087)
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Field of study * year yes yes yes
Bologna06 * ﬁeld study:
agriculture -0.088 -0.142 -0.141
(0.265) (0.272) (0.267)
law, social sciences -0.038 -0.019 -0.030
(0.218) (0.219) (0.217)
architecture -0.112 -0.172 -0.186
(0.231) (0.236) (0.235)
natural sciences -0.394 -0.372 -0.390
(0.248) (0.248) (0.246)
economics, business 0.007 0.021 0.025
(0.239) (0.240) (0.237)







health -0.194 -0.273 -0.256
(0.237) (0.240) (0.236)







N 7718 7718 7718
N-g 1323 1323 1323
LL -24430.03 -24416.98 -24415.28
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%. Standard errors in paren-
theses: Huber-White adjusted standard errors, considering clustering of obser-
vations within each academic program for diﬀerent moments in time. N is the
number of observations, N-g is the number of groups institution/program, and
LL stands for log-likelihood. All regressions include program-speciﬁc dummy
variables.
21Table 5: Summary statistics by year and phase
2003 2004 2005 2006
Variable Ph1 Ph2 Ph1 Ph2 Ph1 Ph2 Ph1 Ph2
Demand: number of hits 196.94 64.95 195.25 38.35 178.61 56.20 194.22 69.36
(207.70) (55.73) (204.13) (36.56) (227.91) (52.30) (230.33) (59.93)
Demand: ﬁrst option 42.56 15.76 41.91 10.14 37.68 13.07 40.92 15.64
(63.06) (18.27) (61.91) (14.07) (65.91) (17.60) (66.87) (18.97)
Bologna06 0.43 0.43
Bologna leader 0.17 0.17
Integrated master 0.04 0.04
Size of the program (vacancies) 45.66 14.21 44.69 12.92 44.23 16.96 46.96 17.20
(33.19) (13.40) (39.27) (12.24) (38.99) (17.46) (38.76) (16.69)
Exams:
maths 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.21 0.21
physics 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
chemistry 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05
biology 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11
portuguese 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
Field of study:
agriculture 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
architecture 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
natural sciences 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
law, social sciecnes 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.17
economics, business 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
sports, arts 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
education 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08
humanities 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08
health 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11
technologies 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.22
Programs 946 903 989 942 1012 976 985 965
Notes: Ph1 and Ph2 stand for phases 1 and 2 in the application process, respectively. Standard deviations
are shown in parenthesis.
22Table 6: Proportion of academic programs adopting the Bologna curricula in 2006/07, by institution
Universities Nr % Polytechnics Nr %
ISCTE 15 93.3 IP Beja 18 55.6
U A¸ cores 27 29.6 IP Bragan¸ ca 41 68.3
U Algarve 50 38.0 IP Castelo Branco 30 53.3
U Aveiro 50 68.0 IP Coimbra 42 2.4
U Beira Interior 27 59.3 IP C´ avado e Ave 8 25.0
U Coimbra 51 2.0 IP Guarda 22 50.0
U ´ Evora 32 12.5 IP Leiria 41 22.0
U Lisboa 48 64.6 IP Lisboa 30 50.0
U Madeira 18 0.0 IP Portalegre 22 31.8
U Minho 43 65.1 IP Porto 50 44.0
U Nova de Lisboa 34 85.3 IP Santar´ em 22 63.6
U Porto 56 19.6 IP Set´ ubal 26 30.8
U T´ ecnica de Lisboa 51 60.8 IP Tomar 20 40.0
U Tr´ as-os Montes e Alto Douro 34 23.5 IP Viana do Castelo 22 36.4
IP Viseu 35 51.4
ESuperiores 20 40.0
Notes: This table considers 985 academic programs, of which 419 have adjusted to the
Bologna principles, 185 in the polytechnics and 234 in the universities. Although some
universities oﬀer polytechnic-type of studies, these are shown only in the university sector
column. ESuperiores include 11 institutions: a nautic school, a hotel management school,
and 9 nursing shools. For more details on data descritpion see section 3.1.
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